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In a classic paper Partee ( 1 973) noted detailed referential and anaphoric parallels 
between tenses and pronouns in English. Since then these parallels have been 
successfully analyzed in terms of domain-neutral principles of discourse reference 
and anaphora - most fully developed in Kamp & Reyle ( 1 993) - which apply 
uniformly to referents of various logical types . These include ordinary individuals 
(the kings and cabbages sort) as well as times, events and states. 
The referential parallel has long been known to extend even further, to the 
modal domain - a discovery due to Kaplan ( 1 978) .  More recently, the anaphoric 
parallel has likewise been extended. At the intuitive level, there is now consensus 
that individuals and possibilities are on a par for the purposes of reference and 
anaphora. But it remains an open question whether the formal analogue of an 
individual in the modal domain - in intuitive terms, a possibility - is a possible 
world (as in Kaplan 1 978, Schlenker 1 999), a class of possible worlds (Stone 
1 997) or a dynamic update (e.g. ,  Frank & Kamp 1 997). 
Orthogonal to this issue, it has also been observed that in all semantic 
domains some referents are more central than others, in the sense of the centering 
theory of Grosz et al ( 1 995).  For example, Stone & Hardt ( 1997) show that 
'sloppy' ellipsis in English generalizes across all semantic domains, and that it can 
be uniformly analyzed as strict discourse anaphora to center-sensitive referents, 
with the illusion of sloppiness due to center shift. 
In this paper I first present crosslinguistic evidence that the parallels 
between individuals and possibilities are indeed pervasive. Moreover, the centering 
parallels are even more detailed than has so far been recognized. These parallels 
favor the view that a possibility - the modal analogue of an individual - is best 
analyzed as a class of possible worlds, as in Stone ( 1 997) . Adopting this view, I 
then develop a semantic representation language, which I call Logic of Change with 
Centered Worlds, in which the observed cross-domain parallels can be formally 
explicated. This logic combines theoretical insights drawn from three sources :  the 
Logic of Change of Muskens ( 1995), the extension to modal anaphora due to Stone 
( 1 997), and the related Logic of Change with Centering presented in Bittner (2001) .  
1.  Individuals and Possibilities in  Natural Languages 
1 . 1 .  Reference and Anaphora 
The sentences of ( 1 )  illustrate the referential parallel between pronouns and modals 
in English. Sentence ( la) was uttered by a receptionist in a dental clinic who saw 
me sitting in the waiting room. We had never met before. But since we both knew 
that the clinic had only one dentist and that this dentist was female, our contextual 
common ground made it easy to identify the intended referent of the pronoun she. 
(1) a .  She' ll be with you shortly. 
b .  My neighbours would kill me. 
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Stone ( 1997) points out a similar referential use of the counterfactual modal 
would in ( 1b) .  In the context he describes the speaker is in a store with hi-fi 
equipment looking longingly at a high-powered system. The natural interpretation is 
that the modal refers to the contextually salient possibility that the speaker might 
buy this system and play it at the intended strength. What ( 1  b) asserts is that in all 
the closest worlds of this prominent possibility the speaker gets killed by the 
neighbours . 
In the examples of ( 1 )  the intended referent is prominent in virtue of the 
extralinguistic context. Alternatively, contextual salience can be raised by recent 
mention in discourse. For example, in (2) the bracketed phrases introduce discourse 
referents for an individual in (a) or a possibility in (b) . These referents are then 
prominent enough to be picked up by anaphoric proforms of matching logical type 
- the pronoun she in (a) and the counterfactual modal would in (b). 
(2) a .  [A doctor] just came in and she' ll be  with you shortly. 
b .  [If ! bought this system] , my neighbours would kill me. 
Stone ( 1997) develops a DRT-style theory of modal reference and anaphora 
in English by hypothesizing that nouns and verbs have an extra argument slot for 
possibilities. The motivation he gives is purely theoretical - this is what he needs 
to make his story work. While English is unrevealing in this respect, other 
languages - including West Greenlandic Eskimo and my native Polish - provide 
striking morphological support. 
Just as Stone' s  hypothesis would predict, the morphology at issue - to 
wit, case and mood inflections - occurs on both nouns and verbs, as illustrated by 
the paradigm in (3)-(6) below. This paradigm suggests a uniform semantics for 
inflectional morphemes - namely, that they are morphological realizations of the 
central arguments of the stem. For agreement inflections, this is just the old idea 
that they are semantically similar to pronouns. What is new is the extension of this 
idea to the possibility argument which, by hypothesis, nouns and verbs also have. 
In Polish and Eskimo the possibility argument is morphologically realized by case 
or mood. Strikingly, these two inflections exhibit the same range of uses -
referential and anaphoric - as the English modal would in ( 1  b) and (2b). 
That is, parallel to the referential use of would in (1 b) we find referential 
uses of case and mood inflections, exemplified in (3) and (4) . 1 
(3) Real object (NOM) v s .  Irrealis object (OBL) 
a .  Woda. Wod-y ! Polish 
water.NOM water-GEN 
(pointing) (in a desert) 
b .  Imiq. Imir-mik! WG Eskimo 
water.NOM water-MOD 
(pointing) (in a desert) 
(4) Real event (JND) v s .  Irrealis event (INF) 
a .  Pracu-j�. Pracowa-c !  Polish 
work-PRs. l SG work-INF 
'I am working' 'Work ! '  
b .  Suli-vu -nga. Suli-llu-tit ! 
work-INd- l sG work-INF-2sG 
WG Eskimo 
'I am working. '  'Work! ' 
37 
38  Maria Bittner 
First, consider case in (3). Both Polish and WG Eskimo allow a bare nominative 
(NOM) to refer to reality. And both contrast this with a designated oblique -
genitive (GEN) in Polish, modalis (MOD) in WG Eskimo - which refers to some 
other contextually salient possibility. So, for example, the bare nominative nouns of 
(3) can be uttered while pointing to a body of water to express the proposition that 
in reality this is water. In contrast, the bare obliques could be used in a desert to 
convey that in the worlds of the speaker' s desire the concept currently on his mind 
is water.
2 
This pattern extends to verbal predicates, as shown in (4) . Here the 
indicative mood asserts the existence of a work event in reality, whereas the 
infinitive indicates that the existence of such an event is desired.
3 
Turning now to the parallel with the anaphoric use of would in (2b), irrealis 
case and mood inflections can likewise be anaphoric . This is shown in (5) and (6) ,  
where the intensional verbs, 'want' or 'promise' ,  play the same role as the if-clause 
in (2b) . That is, they set up a referent for a possibility - the class of worlds the 
speaker would rather be in, or the class of worlds where the promise is fullfilled. 
This possibility serves as the antecedent for the anaphoric inflection - oblique or 
infinitive - on the complement of the intensional verb. 
(5) Anaphoric Obliques 
a.  Chc-� wod-y. 
[want]-PRs. l sG water-GEN 
'I want water. ' 
b .  Imir-mik niriursur-pa-ra. 
water-MOD [promise]-IND
2-1SG.3SG 
'I promised him water. ' 
(6) Anaphoric Infinitives 
a. Chc-� pracowa-c. 
[want]-PRs. l sG work-INF 
'I want to work. ' 
b .  Suli-ssa-llu-nga mnursur-pa-ra. 
work-Exp-INF-lsG [promise ]_lND
2 
- l sG.3sG 
'I promised him to work. ' 
Polish 
WG Eskimo 
Polish 
WG Eskimo 
In summary, the hypothesis that individuals and possibilities are on a par in 
lexical argument structures is not only theoretically attractive. It also receives 
empirical support from inflectional patterns which languages as diverse as Polish 
and WG Eskimo converge on. Under this hypothesis, it is not an accident that the 
same obliques crop up in (3) and (5), and the same infinitives in (4) and (6). These 
case and mood inflections presuppose that the possibility argument of the stem is 
irrealis . They are modal proforms, similar to the English modal would, so it is 
expected that they will have both referential and anaphoric uses. Neither is it an 
accident that case and mood inflections tend to cluster with person agreement. 
Agreement markers, too, are proforms which realize central arguments of the stem. 
The only difference is in logical type - arguments which trigger person agreement 
are individuals, not possibilities. 
1 .2. Center vs. Periphery: Correlative Topic-Comment Structures 
So far, crosslinguistic evidence confirms the referential and anaphoric parallels 
uncovered by English-based research and the crosslinguistic work of Schlenker 
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( 1999). I now tum to a more radical claim, that the semantic parallels between 
individuals and possibilities are even more detailed than has so far been recognized. 
Particularly dramatic evidence comes from centering parallels in biclausal 
topic-comment structures known as correlatives. Crosslinguistically the details 
vary but the stable pattern is that the dependent clause introduces one or more 
topical referents to be commented on by the matrix clause, where each topical 
referent must be picked up by - correlated with - an anaphoric proform. 
In English this structural type is arguably instantiated by conditionals - the 
dependent if-clause sets up a topical possibility, which is linked to the modal 
anaphor then in the matrix comment. Crucially, many languages allow analogous 
readings with topical individuals, as in the ambiguous Warlpiri correlative (7) (fIrst 
noted by Hale 1976). 
(7) Maliki-rli kaji-ngki yarlki-rni nyuntu 
[dog-ERG ST-3SG.2SG bite-NPsT you] 
ngula-ju kapi-ma luwa-mi ngajulu-rlu. 
DEM-TOP FUT- 1SG.3SG shoot-NPST me-ERG 
A. 'As for the dog that bites you, I' ll shoot it. ' 
B .  'If a dog bites you, then I' ll shoot it. '  
(individual-centered) 
(possibility-centered) 
The dependent clause of (7) - with the complementizer kaji, glossed 'ST' for 'same 
topic' - introduces a topical referent of some type. On reading (7 A) the topic is a 
contextually prominent individual, and on reading (7B), a prominent possibility. In 
either case, the topical referent is picked up in the matrix comment by a topic­
oriented anaphoric demonstrative ngula-ju, which is likewise type-neutral. So 
depending on the context, the topic of (7) may be either the most prominent dog 
which bites the addressee or the closest possibility that a dog may bite. The 
correlated comment is that the speaker will shoot the topical dog, or that in every 
world of the topical possibility the speaker will shoot whatever dog bites there. 
The fact that one and the same sentence can have both of these readings 
suggests that they have essentially the same semantic representation, up to logical 
type. This, in a nutshell, is the analysis I will propose. In particular, both readings 
of the ambiguous Warlpiri correlative (7) involve a type-neutral operation which I 
will call topical maximization. On the individual-centered reading (7 A), this 
operation selects the greatest and most central element from the contextual set of 
biting dogs. On the possibility-centered reading (7B),  it selects the greatest and 
closest element from the contextual set of possibilities with a biting dog. So topical 
maximization draws the following point-for-point parallels across the two domains. 
(-) Individual domain 
atom 
individual (consisting of atoms) 
most central 
part-whole order �e 
�-greatest individual 
Modal domain 
world 
possibility (consisting of worlds) 
closest 
part-whole order Cwt 
�wrgreatest possibility 
To some extent, these parallels have been hinted at in informal remarks by 
typologists (e.g. ,  Andrews 1975, Hale 1976, Haiman 1 978).  There is even a hint 
of a possible theoretical approach (von Fintel 1994) .  But, as far as I can see, there 
is still no formally explicit semantic theory which can draw these parallels. To be 
sure, there are theories of maximization for defInite noun phrases (e.g . ,  Sharvy 
1980, Link 1983, Groenendijk et a1 1995) or individual-centered correlatives (e .g . ,  
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Cooper 1979, Dayal 1996, Grosu & Landman 1998) or conditional correlatives 
(e.g . ,  Frank & Kamp 1997, Stone 1997). But all of these theories are stated in 
domain-specific terms which make it difficult to capture the cross-domain parallels 
dramatically revealed by correlatives with ambiguous centers, such as Warlpiri (7).4 
Further details are revealed by Indo-Aryan languages, Marathi (8)-(9) (from 
Andrews 1975) and Hindi ( 10)-( 1 1 )  (from my own field work) . In Marathi, unlike 
in Warlpiri, correlative morphology is sensitive to type, as illustrated by the j/t 
paradigm in (8). 
(8) P 'which' jevha 'when' jithe 'where' . . .  jEr 'if jEri 'although' 
tya 'that' tevha 'then' tithe 'there' . . .  tEr 'then' tEri 'even so' 
Also, each topical referent is marked in the dependent clause by a typed j­
word - e.g., ja . . .  ja in (9a), jEr in (9b) - and is picked up in the matrix comment 
by a related t-word. Thus, (9a) is about a pair of topical individuals - to wit, the 
contextually most prominent pair of a boy and a girl he hated. Similarly, (9b) is 
about a topical possibility - the closest worlds where the relevant man comes. 
(9) a. Ja mula-ni ja muli-shi dues kela, 
[which bOY-ERG which girl-GEN hatred did] 
'As for that boy and the girl he hated, 
tya-ni ti-Ia mar-Ii. 
that.M-ERG that.F-ACC kill-PST 
he killed her. ' 
b .  JEr to ithE yel, 
[if that.M here comes] 
'lfhe comes here, 
tEr miN tya-Ia goli mar-in. 
then me. ERG that.M-Acc bullet kill-PUT 
then I'll kill him. ' 
In a different way, then, Marathi points to the same parallel as Warlpiri, 
strengthening the motivation for a domain-neutral representation of correlative 
topics. The Indo-Aryan evidence further shows that the desired representation must 
generalize not only across semantic domains but also across n-tuples of topical 
referents. In particular, topical maximization must apply correctly to such n-tuples .  
For instance, in Marathi (9a) and Hindi ( 10) - with two j-marked topical 
NPs in the dependent clause - topical maximization must select the greatest and 
most central element from the contextual set of pairs of topical referents that satisfy 
the dependent clause. Moreover, in a well-formed correlative each coordinate of the 
n-tuple of topical referents introduced by the dependent clause must be picked up by 
an anaphor in the matrix comment (as in (9a) and ( 10)).  Note that the correlation 
need not be one-one because split antecedents are permitted (as noted by McCawley 
1992, and illustrated by the Hindi example ( 10)). 
( 10) Jo laRkii jis laRke-se baat kar rahii hai, ve dost haiN. 
[which girl which bOY-INS talk do PRG is] those friends are 
'As for the girl and the boy she talking to, they are friends. ' 
What is not permitted are dangling topical referents in the dependent clause 
which the matrix comment fails to address . Hence the ill-formedness of ( l l a), 
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where the comment fails to say anything about the topical boy. The minimally 
contrasting ( l Ib) is good again because the offending topical j-determiner, jis, is 
replaced with ek 'one' . With this referent removed from the center of attention, the 
matrix comment is now properly about the j-marked topic. 
( 1 1 ) a. * Jo laRkii jis laRke-se baat kar rahii hai, vo lambii haL 
[which girl which boy-INS talk do PRG is] that tall.SG.F i s .  
( 'As for the girl and the boy she' s talking to, she i s  tall . ' )  
b .  Jo laRkii ek laRke-se baat kar rahii hai, vo lambii haL 
[which girl one bOY-INS talk do PRG is] that tall .SG.F is 
'As for the girl who's  talking to a boy, she is tall. ' 
In general, the centering theory of Grosz et al ( 1995) provides a natural 
approach to correlative topics. Topical discourse referents - syntactically j-marked 
in Indo-Aryan and semantically distinguished by topical maximization as well as 
aboutness presuppositions - are in the center of attention and in contrast to 
peripheral referents . This semantic contrast is akin to focal vs. peripheral vision. 
This basic idea can be made formally precise by extending the Logic of 
Clumge with Centering of Bittner (2001 ) . This logic - unlike competing formal 
theories of centering (e.g. ,  Stone & Hardt 1997) - crucially allows for structured 
centers, with n-tuples of central drer s of any type. This is needed, for instance, in 
(9a) and ( 10) to explicate the intuition that the topic is a pair of central individuals 
who stand in the relevant relation. We also need to allow for topics of other types, 
including possibilities. Toward this end, we will add possible worlds, as in Stone 
( 1997), who also builds on the Logic of Change of Muskens ( 1995) . This is done 
in section 2. As will be shown in the subsequent sections, the resulting semantic 
representation language will enable us to explicate the point-for-point parallels 
between individuals and possibilities that languages all over the globe converge on. 
2. Logic of Change with Centered Worlds 
The ontology of our Logic of Change with Centered Worlds is laid out in Table 1 ,  
which also gives an overview of the key terms and the abbreviatory conventions. 
Table 1 .  
Type Abbr. Name of objects 
t 
w 
s 
w x s x s  s 
sst 
e 
wt 
we 
w (wt) 
sa 
00 
E 
Q 
truth values 
worlds 
stacks 
centered worlds 
updates 
individuals 
possibilities 
static e-concepts 
static oo-concepts 
dynamic a-concepts, 
a E { e, 00, E, Q }  
x 
p 
y 
q 
w 
c, d 
i, j, h 
J 
x 
p 
y 
q 
TDem .LDem 
4 1  
42 Maria Bittner 
In addition to the familiar basic types - t for truth values, w for possible 
worlds, and e for individuals - there is one new basic type, s ,  for stacks of 
prominence-ranked discourse referents (dref s for short) . A centered world -
intuitively, a world viewed from a particular perspective - is formally a triple of a 
world and two stacks. These, too, are ranked by prominence - the top stack ( T ) , 
for dref s in the center of attention, outranks the bottom stack (..1), for peripheral 
dref s.  Updates are modelled as transitions from one centered world to another. 
This articulates the intuition that an update can affect both the factual information 
(modelled by the world coordinate, as in Stalnaker 1975) and relative prominence in 
the center of attention and background (modelled by the two stacks of dref s). 
In contrast to classical dynamic systems (such as Kamp & Reyle 1993), 
dref s are not variables, but actual semantic objects that are prominent enough to be 
referred to by anaphoric demonstratives (as in Dekker 1994, Bittner 2001 ) . For our 
purposes, we need four types of dref s - individuals, possibilities, individual 
concepts, and possibility concepts (types e, W, E, and Q) .  Note that the concept of 
a possibility is an accessibility relation over possible worlds (Q := w(wt» . 
Variables, on this view, are merely tools for stacking dref objects. Since we 
have two stacks - top (T )  and bottom (..1) - we need two sets of variables for 
stacking dref s and two sets of demonstratives for retrieving them. More precisely, 
dref s are added to the top stack by top variables (x , p ,  . . .  E TVar) and to the 
bottom stack by bottom variables (x, p ,  . . .  E .iVar) . Similarly, dref s are retrieved 
from the top stack by top demonstratives, of the form dan' and from the bottom 
stack by bottom demonstratives, of the form dan' For all demonstratives, top and 
bottom, the type index a E { e, W ,  E, O }  indicates the type of dref to be retrieved, 
and the numerical index n, how many dref s of that type are to be skipped first. So 
anaphoric demonstratives identify their antecedents not by arbitrary indices, but by 
their current prominence rank, which depends on three factors - the stack (center 
vs. background), the type and the rank among the objects of that type on that stack. 
Stacks are thus intended to model sequences of prominence-ranked dref 
objects. But formally they are just primitive objects in the model. To make sure that 
they behave as intended we will constrain them by axioms which formally define 
two projection functions: 1tn, which returns the n' s coordinate of the input, and 1ta, 
which returns the result of retaining just the coordinates of type a. We abbreviate 
1tn(1ta(c» as 1tn a(c) (n' th a-dref on stack c), and { e, W, E, O }  as e (types of dref s). 
The first two axioms ensure that the identity of a stack is fully determined 
by its projections, and that any potential dref object - i.e . ,  any individual, 
possibility, individual concept, or possibility concept - can be added to any stack. 
AXI VcVd(VnVa E 8(1tn, a(c) = 1tn, aCd» � C = d) 
AX2 VcVa E  8Vva 3d(1t1 (d) = va !\ Vn(n >  1 � 1tn(d) = 1tn _ l(c» ) 
Axiom 1 is straightforward - if two stacks agree on all of their projections, then it 
must be the same stack. Axiom 2 ensures that for any stack and dref object there is 
another stack with that object on top and everything below it as on the first stack. 
To state the remaining axioms we need to defme an operation on centered 
worlds which returns the recentered world that results from adding a new dref 
object to the top or bottom stack. This is done in definition 1 .  Clause (i) says that, 
for any centered world i, adding a new dref object to the top stack of i, T i' leaves 
the world coordinate, Wi' and the bottom stack, ..1i, unchanged, whereas on the top 
stack the new dref object is most prominent and all prior dref s are demoted one 
notch. Mutatis mutandis, adding a new dref to the bottom stack has analogous 
effects. These are spelled out in clause (ii). 
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DEFINITION 1 (Recentering) . Given centered worlds i = (wj, T j' 1.) , j  = (wj, Tj, 1.), 
and variables ua E TVara, ua E .lVara: 
1 .  (ua ' i) = j iff 
Wj = w/, 1.j = 1.j 1\ 7tI ( Tj) = ua 1\ Vn(n > 1 � 7ti Tj) = 7tn_I (T j)) 
ii. (Ua ' i) = j iff 
Wj = Wj 1\ Tj = T j 1\ 7tI (1.j) = ua 1\ Vn(n > 1 � 7ti.lj) = 7tn_I (1.j)) 
The remaining axioms articulate the intuition that prominence rank is relative 
to logical type. For intuitively, adding a new dref object of a certain type to a given 
stack (say, a new topical possibility) demotes in prominence only older dref s of the 
same type on that stack (i .e . ,  old topical possibilities). It has no bearing on the 
prominence rank of dref s of other types (e .g . ,  topical individuals or concepts) .  
Axioms 3 and 4 ensure this for the top stack and axioms 5 and 6, for the bottom 
stack. Formally, they do this by constraining the projection function 1ta, which 
returns the result of retaining just the coordinates of type a from the input stack. 
AX3 (ua ' i) = j � 7tI , iTj) = ua 1\ Vn(n > 1 � 7tn, iT) = 7tn_I , i T j)) 
AX4 (ua ' i) = j � Vb E E>(b :# a � 7tb(Tj) = 7tb( T j)) 
AX5 (ua . i) = j � 7t1• i1.j) = ua 1\ Vn(n > 1 � 7tn• i1.j) = 7tn-l • i.lj)) 
AX6 (ua ' i) = j � Vb E E>(b :# a � 7tb(1.j) = 7tb(.lj)) 
We are now ready to interpret the terms of our logic (definition 2) . Taking 
cue from natura1 language morphology - e.g . ,  the jlt paradigm (8) of Marathi -
dref-introducing variables are not conflated with dref-retrieving demonstratives. 
DEFlNmON 2 (Interpretation of terms) 
1 .  
11. 
t o  .-
.-
da 0 .= n . 
.-
da,,0 '-.-
.-
Aiw t 
Aiw tw 
Aiw 7tn+l . a( T ) 
Aiw 7tn+I , iT )w 
Aiw 7tn+l • i1.j) 
Aiw 7tn+l • i1.j)w 
, if t E MEa' a E { e , m }  
, if t E MEa ' a E { E, Q }  
, if a E { e , m }  
, if a E { E, Q }  
, if a E { e , m }  
, if a E { E, Q }  
More precisely, clause (i) interprets constants and variables in the usual way (as in 
Stone 1997) . By clause (ii), anaphoric demonstratives are interpreted as pointers to 
fixed stack positions (as in Bittner 2001 ) . For example, given a centered world i , 
the demonstrative dooo will retrieve the highest possibility from the top stack of i .  
Similarly, dEo will retrieve the highest individual concept from the bottom stack of 
i. In intuitive terms, dooo retrieves the currently most prominent topical possibility, 
and dEo, the most prominent individual concept from the current background. 
Since, by default, all anaphora is top level - i.e . ,  it normally targets the most 
prominent dref object of the relevant type on the relevant stack - index 0 is 
suppressed in what follows (i.e. ,  we write da for dao' and da for dao) ' 
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Canonical conditions and DRS boxes are built according to the BNF syntax 
given in definition 3 .5 The only syntactic innovation, adapted from Stone ( 1 997), is 
that relational conditions are relativized to a modal domain - the subscripted term 
t, which can be of type 0) := wt (possibility) or Q :=  w(wt) (possibility concept) . 
DEFINITION 3 (Canonical conditions and boxes) 
i .  C : := Rt(tl , · . .  , tn) I (tl = t2) I (C, C) 
ii. D . .  - [vl . . .  vnl C] I £ I C] I (D � D) 
Semantically, conditions are properties of centered worlds and boxes, 
transitions from one centered world to another (definition 4, a la Muskens 1 995). 
DEFINITION 4 (Interpretation of conditions and boxes) 
i .  Rt(tl , . . .  , tn) 
(tl = t2) 
(Cl , C2) 
ii. [VI . . .  vnl C] 
£ l C] 
(Dl ; D2) 
.-.-
.-.-
.-.-
.-.-
.-.-
.-
Ai 'v'W(tOiWiW � Rw(tl ° iw, . . .  , tn °iw)) 
Ai ( 0 · 0 · ) tl lWi = tl lWi 
Ai (Cli /\ C2i) 
Aij 3vl . . .  vi(V l · . . .  (Vn · i)) = j /\ Ci) 
Aij (i = j /\ CO 
Aij 3h(Dlih /\ D2hj) 
Note that by clause (i), a relational condition relativized to a possibility must 
hold throughout that possibility (as in Stone 1 997). For example, the condition 
getq(me, y) is satisfied at a centered world i iff in every world W accessible from the 
world of i, Wi' via q the speaker gets the w-extension of the individual concept y. 
In clause (ii), DRS boxes are interpreted as in Bittner (200 1 ) .  Note that the 
order of the variables in the universe of a box is significant. It reflects the order of 
stacking, and so the prominence rank. Also, variables get bound off as soon as they 
have stacked their values. Only the stacked dref objects - individuals, individual 
concepts, possibilities, or possibility concepts - are retrievable by anaphoric 
demonstratives. Finally, a sequence of two updates, (Dl ; D2), is interpreted in the 
usual way - update the initial context with Dl and then the result, with D2. 
3. Examples: Obliques and Infinitives in Intensional Contexts 
We now have the formal tools we need to represent nominal and modal anaphora in 
complements of intensional verbs. For example, consider again the Polish examples 
(5a), with an oblique (genitive) complement, and (6a), with an infinitive. 
The gloss of (5a) is repeated in (5a') together with the proposed semantic 
representation. Note that reality is represented by the totally realistic accessibility 
relation, r := AWW'(W = w').  Also, updates are numbered for ease of reference. The 
indicated compositional path assumes the bridging semantics of Bittner (200 1 ) . For 
now, my concern is not the compositional derivation, but rather the prior issue -
namely, the bottom line representation that the composition should aim for. 
(5a') ( l ) want-PRs. l sG (
2) water-GEN 
(
l ) [q yl wantr(me, q), getq(me, y)] ; 
(2) [ I waterdI.l(dE)] 
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This sequence of updates affects the prominence hierarchy as well as factual 
information, in the manner spelled out in (U5a) below: 
(U5a) • 
( l ) [q yl wantr(me, q) , getq(me, y)] 
- (defmition 4) 
Aij :3 qy( q . (y . i) = j 
A V'w(rOiwjw � wantw(meOiw, qOiw» 
A V'w(qOiwjW � getw(meOiw, yOiw» ) 
- (definition 2, r, q E MEn' me E MEe, y E MEE) 
Aij :3 qy( q . (y . i) = j 
A V'w(rwjW � wantw(me, qW» A V'W(qWjW � getw(me, Yw» ) 
- (reality r := AWW '(W = W ')  
A ij  :3qy(q . (y . i) = j 
A want w . (me, qwj) A V'w(qWjW � getw(me, Yw» ) 
I 
• 
( 1 ) [q yl wantr(me, q), getq(me, y)] ; 
(2) [ I waterdn(dE)] 
- (definition 4, dO := dOo, dE := dEo) 
Aij :3h(:3qy(q . (y . i) = h 
A want w. (me, qwj) A V'w(qWjW � getw(me, Yw» ) 
I 
A h =j 
A V'w(dOoOhwhW � waterw(dEoOhw» ) 
- (eliminate h, defmitions 1-2, rearrange) 
Aij :3qy(q . (y . i) = j 
A want w. (me, qwJ A V'w(qWjW � getw(me, Yw» 
I 
A V'w(1t1 , n( Tj)wjw � waterw(1t1 , iJ..j)w» ) 
- (AX 3-5, rearrange) 
Aij :3 qy( q . (y . i) = j 
A want w. (me, qwj) A V'w(qWjW � getw(me, Yw) A waterw(yw») 
I 
That is, in a more intuitive DRT style format, the two updates add the dref 
objects in (R5a) with the conditions listed in (C5a) . Note that (RSa) keeps track of 
center shifts by monitoring the reference of the demonstratives that occur in (Sa') -
dQ (that topical possibility concept) and dE (that backgrounded individual concept). 
j = (wj, T j' J) (after ( 1» 
AW 'W. WW 'w 
AW. Cw 
h = j (after (2» 
AW 'W. WW 'w 
AW. Cw 
• want w . (me, Wwj) • V'w(WWjW � waterwCcw» 
I 
• V'w(WWjW � getw(me, cw» 
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Consider ftrst the initial update, by the intensional verb 'want-PRs . l sG' . 
Starting from a centered world i, this update yields a recentered worldj if the factual 
conditions listed under j in (CSa) can be met and, otherwise, will eliminate i from 
the common ground. Assuming that i survives, two new dref' s will be added - an 
co-concept to the top stack (added by q and in (RSa) denoted by W, for 'wish') ,  and 
an e-concept to the bottom stack (added by y and denoted by c, for 'concept' ) .  
These two dref' s must satisfy the conditions imposed by wantr(me, q) and 
getg(me, y). That is, from every real world the topical wish-concept W gives access to the worlds that the speaker would rather be in, and in all of these wish worlds the 
speaker gets the extension of the concept c. Now, recall that reality is modelled here 
as the totally realistic accessibility relation r, which from each world gives access to 
that world only. So, from the perspective of i, 'every real world' amounts to just 
Wj' This reduction yields the two conditions listed under j in (CSa) ' 
The intensional verb thus sets up the context for its oblique complement, 
'water-GEN' .  This does not add any new dref' s - there is no recentering here -
but only new factual information. That is, this is a so-called test. To survive this 
test Wj must meet the condition imposed by waterdn(dE'). That is, in every world 
that can be reached from W j by the currently topical possibility concept, the 
extension of the main individual concept in the current background is water. The 
current stacks are those under j, so this amounts to the condition under h - in each 
of the speaker' s wish worlds that can be accessed from Wj what he gets is water. 
The analysis of (6a), with an inftnitive complement, is analogous - as 
shown in (6a') - modulo a slight adjustment in the meaning of the verb. In a 
control structure it is not an implicit object concept but rather the subject individual 
- here, the speaker - that the verb sets up as a backgrounded dref to be picked up 
by the complement. 
(6a') ( 1 ) want-PRs . l SG (2) work-INF 
( l ) [q xl wantr(x, q), x = me] ; (2) [ I workdQ(de)] 
j = (wj, T j' .lj) (after ( 1 ») 
AW 'W. WW 'w 
me 
• want w. (me, Wwj) 
I 
• 'v'w(WWjW � workw(me)) 
h = j (after (2») 
AW 'W. WW 'w 
me 
However, the anaphora to a topical possibility concept - the speaker' s wishes -
still proceeds just as before. This captures the anaphoric parallel between obliques 
and inftnitives in intensional contexts. And if we just leave out the intensional verb 
and let the extralinguistic context do its work, then the referential parallel between 
bare obliques and inftnitives - exemplifted in (3) and (4) - also falls into place. 
4. Topical Maximization across Domains 
The Logic of Change with Centered Worlds also provides a natural framework for 
explicating domain-neutral generalizations about central dref' s in correlative topic­
comment structures. In particular, we can now draw a formal parallel between 
reference to the greatest and most central element within the contextual set of 
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topical individuals that are so-and-so, and reference to the greatest and closest 
element within the contextual set of topical possibilities - classes of possible 
worlds - that are so-and-so. To draw this parallel, we defme a domain-neutral 
operation of topical maximization which, applied to an update that introduces one or 
more central dref s, selects the greatest and closest dref s of the lot. 
As a fIrst step, we defIne two domain-neutral orders, ::;; and �, generalizing 
the proximity order of Lewis ( 1973) and the part-whole order of Sharvy ( 1 980) to 
dref objects of all types. The defInitions in (TI )  and (T2) below make precise the 
cross-domain parallels (-) informally drawn in section 1 .2 .  Crucially, individuals 
made up of atoms (see Sharvy 1980, Link 1983) must be aligned with possibilities 
made up of worlds (Stone 1 997) . If possibilities are modelled as worlds simpliciter 
(e.g . ,  Schlenker 1 999), there is not enough structure for maximization parallels, 
and if they are modelled as updates (e.g. ,  Frank & Kamp 1 997), there is too much. 
(-) Individual domain 
atom 
individual (consisting of atoms) 
most central 
part-whole order Ce 
Ce-greatest individual 
Modal domain 
world 
possibility (consisting of worlds) 
closest 
part-whole order � 
�-greatest possibility 
The order ::;;i' defIned in (Tl) ,  ranks objects t and U of any dref type a by 
proximity to the a-center of the centered world i. It says that, viewed from the a­
center of i, t is at least as close as U just in case the i-extension of U contains no 
elements - atoms or worlds, as appropriate - that are closer to the a-center of i 
than any elements of the i-extension of t. In other words, the i-closer object, t, 
consists only of elements that are closer to the a-center of i . For individuals and 
individual concepts - that is, a e { e , E} - the a-center of i is its most central 
individual, 1tl, iT i) ' For possibilities and possibility concepts - a e { oo, Q }  - the 
a-center of i is its world coordinate, Wi' 
(Tl )  ta �i ua ( 'from the a-center of i, ta is at least as close as ua' ) abbreviates 
\-1 '1 o ·  , o ·  , < < ') ' f  { E} v xx , X E ta lWi A X E Ua lWi A X -i X --7 X -i X 1 a E e, 
\-1 '1 o ·  , o ·  , < < ') ' f { r\ } v WW ,W E ta lWi A W E Ua lWi A W -i W --7 W -i W 1 a E O), �.!i 
The symbol 'e ' is used here to denote the domain-neutral relation 'is an 
elementary part of . In the individual domain, this relates an atom to an individual 
(singular or plural) it is part of - e.g . ,  'x e ta °iw;' . In the modal domain, this is 
the relation between a world and a possibility (class of worlds) it instantiates -
i.e . ,  'w  e ta °iw;' reduces to 'ta ° iwiw , . Following Lewis ( 1 973),  I assume that 
worlds are partly ordered by a primitive relation W ::;;i w�  which ranks W and w '  by 
proximity to the world of i, Wi' Extending this partial order to atoms, x ::;;i x' ranks x 
and x'by proximity to the most central individual on the top stack of i, 1tl e( T i)' 
In the same spirit, defInition (T2) says that, viewed from the a-center of i, t 
is included in U iff U - the greater object - includes every i-closest element of t. 
(T2) ta ci ua ( 'viewed from the a-center of i, ta is included in ua' ) abbreviates 
\-I ( o ·  3 '1 ' o ·  , < ) 'f { E} v x X E ta lWi --7 X ,x E ua lWi A X -i X 1 a E e, 
\-I ( o ·  3 '1 '  o ·  '< ) v W W E  ta lWi --7 W ,W E Ua lWi A W -i W if a E {O), Q }  
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Given these two ways to rank dref objects, stacks of dref' s can be ranked -
for proximity or size - by pointwise comparison, as in (T3) .  
(T3) C �i d iff 'v'n(1tn(c) �i 1tn(d» 
C ci d iff 'v'n(1tn(c) �i 1tn(d» 
And this, in tum, makes it possible to define a domain-neutral operation of 
topical maximization, as in (T4) below. 
Aij (Dij A 'v'h(Dih ---7 Tj �i T h A T h Ci T) 
Applied to an update D, this operation returns a more restricted update relation, 
denoted by T D, where out of the topical dref' s of D only the closest and greatest 
survive. 
5. Examples: Center vs. Periphery in Correlatives 
We are now ready to represent cross-domain centering parallels in correlative topic­
comment structures, by means of parallel semantic representations up to logical 
type. For example, in the ambiguous Warlpiri correlative (7), the complementizer 
'ST' ( 'same topic' )  signals the introduction of a topical referent but underdetermines 
its type. So depending on the context of (7), the topical referent may be an 
individual - the contextually salient dog that bites the addressee - added by x in 
(7' A). Or it may be a possibility - that a dog may bite - added by p in (7'B).6. 
7 
(7') [( 1 ) dog-ERG (2) ST-3sG.2SG (3)[bite-NPsT you]] 
A. T ( l ) [xl dogr(x)] ; (2) [ I de � del ] ; (3) [ I biter(de, you)]) ? , 
B .  \(l)[Y1 dogdW(Y)] ; (2) [pl p � dw] ; (3) [ I bitedw(dE, you)]) ?; 
(4) [DEM-TOP FUT- lsG.3SG shoot-NPST me-ERG] 
(4) [ I shootr(me, de)] 
(4) [ I shootdw(me, dE)] 
In either case the topical stack - here, just one topical dref - undergoes 
maximization. We'll get back to the details of this below. The resulting topical 
update combines with the matrix comment by topic-comment sequencing, ?; (read: 
'what about it?' )  - a presuppositional sequencing operator defined for independent 
purposes in Bittner (2001 ) .  This operator is interpreted like ordinary sequencing 
except for an aboutness presupposition. The intuitive idea is that topic-comment 
sequencing presupposes that the comment is about the topic. Formally, a sequence 
of the form (D1 
?; D
2
) requires that every topical dref introduced in the topic update 
Dl must be picked up by an anaphoric demonstrative in the comment update D2• In (7') the aboutness presupposition is satisfied by both representations. In 
(7' A) the topical dref added by x in the topic update, T ( • • •  ), is picked up in the 
comment update by the demonstrative de. Similarly, in (7'B) the topical possibility 
added by p is picked up by the demonstrative dU) . In Warlpiri (7) both of these 
topic-oriented demonstratives are morphologically realized by the same type-neutral 
form ngula-ju - hence the ambiguity. Note that on the possibility-centered reading 
(7'B) the aboutness presupposition does not care about the backgrounded dref, 
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introduced by y (individual concept) . A backgrounded dref may be optionally 
picked up in the comment, as it is here, but it need not be. The possibility-centered 
reading of the topic clause - 'If a dog bites you, . . .  ' - would also be felicitous 
with a comment like ' . . .  then I'll be upset' . What would violate the aboutness 
presupposition would be a topical if-clause without a commenting then-clause. And 
likewise in the individual domain (recall Hindi ( 1 1 ), and see ( 1 2) below). 
Returning now to the details of topical maximization, we begin with the 
possibility-centered reading (7'B) .  Here topical maximization just reconstructs the 
classical ordering semantics for conditionals - the version due to Lewis ( 1 973),  
with universal quantification over the closest antecedent worlds. To see how it does 
that, consider the context change potential of the topical update on this reading: 
(T 7B) T «(1)[Y1 dogdCO(Y)] ; (2) [pl p C dro] ;  (
3)[ 1 bitedCO(dE, you)]) 
- (section 2, contextual modal base B := 1tl,  co(T ;)) 
T Aij 3py(p . (y . i) = j " 'v'w(Bw � dogw(yw))  
" p C B " 'v'w(pw � bitew(Yw' you))) 
- (T4) 
Aij (3py(p . (y . i) = j " 'v'w(Bw � dogw(yw) ) 
" p C B " 'v'w(pw � bitew(Yw' you))) 
" 'v'h(3p'y '(p' . (y ' . i) = h " 'v'w(Bw � dogw(Y 'w))  
" p' C B " 'v'w(p'w � bitew(Y 'w' you))) 
� T j �i T h " T h ci T j)) 
- (eliminate h, rearrange) 
Aij 3py(p . (y . i) = j " 'v'w(Bw � dogw(yw)) 
" p C B " 'v'w(pw � dogw(yw) " bitew(Yw' you)) 
" 'v'p'(p' c B " 3y ' 'v'w(p'w � dogw(Y 'w) " bitew(Y 'w' you)) 
� T p . i �i T p' . i " T p' . i ci T P . i)) 
- (T3, definition 1 )  
Aij 3py(p . (y . i) = j " 'v'w(Bw � dogw(yw))  
" p c B " 'v'w(pw � dogw(yw) " bitew(Yw' you)) 
" 'v'p'(p' c B " 3y ' 'v'w(p'w � dogw(Y 'w) " bitew(Y 'w' you)) 
� p �i P' " p' ci P)) 
- (Tl ,  T2) 
Aij 3py(p . (y . i) = j " 'v'w(Bw � dogw(yw)) 
" p c B " 'v'w(pw � dogw(yw) " bitew(Yw' you)) 
" 'v'p'(p' c B ,, 3y' 'v'w(p'w � dogw(Y 'w) " bitew(Y 'w' you)) 
� 'v'ww '(w E p " W ' E p' " W '�i W � W ' �i w) 
" 'v'w '(w '  E p' � 3w(w E P "  W �i w 1)) 
That is - recasting the bottom line in the more intuitive DRT style format 
- the topical dependent clause and the matrix comment add the dref objects in 
(R7B) with the conditions listed in (C7B) .  Let us consider each of these in turn. 
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j = (wj, Tj, J...j) (after T [( 1}-{3))) 
AW. Aw 
AW. Bw 
AW. CW 
h = j (after comment (4)) 
AW. A w  
AW. B w  
AW. Cw 
(C7S) Topic description atj 
• A = THEj Ap[p C B A 3yVw(pw ---7 dogw(yw) A bitew(Yw' you))] 
:= A c B A 3yVw(Aw ---7 dogw(yw) A bitew(Yw' you)) 
A Vp[p c B A 3yVw(pw ---7 dogw(yw) A bitew(Yw' you)) 
---7 A Sj p A p  Cj A] 
• Vw(Bw ---7 dogw(cw)) A Vw(Aw ---7 bitew(cw' you)) 
Comment at h 
• Vw(Aw ---7 shootw(me, cw)) 
First of all, note that the representation of the initial noun ( 'dog-ERG') refers 
to the currently topical possibility (via the demonstrative doo). So for this reference 
to be felicitous, we need an initial centered world i with a possibility on the top 
stack. In (R7B) this is represented by Aw. Bw , which plays the domain-restricting 
role of a contextual modal base. From the initial centered world i, the dependent 
topic clause takes us to a recentered world j, by adding another topical possibility, 
Aw. A w - this demotes the modal base AW. B W one notch - as well as a 
backgrounded individual concept, AW.Cw' 
These two new dref s must satisfy the conditions listed for j in (C7B). The 
flrst condition says that, viewed from Wj - the oo-center of i - A  is the closest and 
greatest possibility, within the modal base B , such that some individual concept is 
realized throughout this possibility as a dog that bites the addressee. The flrst line is 
a Russell-style abbreviation, while the next three lines spell out what this means. 
Well, to qualify as the closest and greatest our topical possibility A must 
meet two requirements. First, it must be in the set of possibilities at issue. That is ,  
A is  included in the modal base B and some individual concept is  realized 
throughout A as a dog that bites the addressee. And secondly, compared to any 
competing possibility p that also meets the flrst requirement, A ranks as i-closer -
i.e., it contains only i-closest worlds - as well as i-greater - i.e., it contains all of 
them. 
The second condition on j constrains the topical possibility A as well as the 
backgrounded concept c. Throughout the modal base B the extension of c must be 
a dog, and throughout A � B it must be a dog that bites the addressee. 
About the new topical possibility A, the matrix comment adds further 
information, which takes us to h - namely, that in every world of the topical 
possibility A the speaker shoots the extension of c, i .e. , whatever dog bites there. 
So on the possibility-centered reading, at the end of the day, what topical 
maximization gets us is just a new approach to the classical ordering semantics for 
conditionals - a reconstruction of Lewis ( 1 973).  The virtue of this new approach 
is that it immediately generalizes to individual-centered readings, such as (7' A). 
Once again, we begin by deriving the context change potential of the topical update. 
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(T 7A) T (
l ) [xl dogr(x)] ; (2) [ I de C del] ; (
3) [ I biter(de, you)]) 
- (section 2, contextual domain b := 7t1 , eCT ;» 
T Ai} ::3x(x . i = }  /\ X c b /\ dog w . (x) /\ bite w . (x, you» 
I I 
- (T4) 
Ai} (::3x(x . i = )  /\ X C b /\ dog w . (x) /\ bite w . (x, you» 
I I 
/\ 'ih(::3x'(x' ·  i = h /\ x' C b /\ dog w. (x') /\ bite w . (x', you» 
I I 
� T j :::;j T h /\ T h cj T) 
- (eliminate h, rearrange) 
Ai} ::3x(x . i) = }  /\ X c b /\ dog w . (x) /\ bite w . (x, you) 
I I 
/\ 'ix' (x' C b /\ dog w. (x') /\ bite w . (x', you) 
I I 
� T x . j :::;j T x' . j /\ T x' . j cj T x .  ;» 
- (T3, definition 1 )  
Ai} ::3x(x . i) = }  /\ X C b /\ dog w. (x) /\ bite w . (x, you) 
I I 
/\ 'ix'(x' c b /\ dog w. (x') /\ bite w . (x', you) 
I I 
� x :::;j X' /\ x' cj x» 
- (Tl ,  T2) 
Ai} ::3x(x . i) = }  /\ X C b dog w (x) /\ bite w . (x, you) 
I I 
/\ 'ix'(x' C b dog w . (x') /\ bite w . (x', you) 
I I 
� 'ixX'(X E  X /\ X ' E x' /\ x ' :::; j X � x :::;j x')  
/\ 'ix'(x' E x '  � ::3x(x E X /\ x :::;j x'») 
To see what this means in intuitive terms, we again recast the bottom line in 
the DRT style format and consider each piece in turn . 
} = (Wj' Tj, ..L) (after T [( 1H3)] )  h =}  (after comment (4) 
a a 
b b 
(C7A) Topic description at) 
• a = THEj AX[x C b /\ dog w. (x) /\ bite w . (x, you)]  
I I 
.- a C b /\ dog w. (a) /\ bite w . (a, you) 
I I 
Comment at h 
• shoot w . (me, a) 
I 
First, parallel to the domain-restricting modal base B presupposed in (R7B) ,  
in (R7A) the domain restriction comes from a presupposed base plurality b .  Within 
that domain, topical maximization selects the closest and greatest top stack that 
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satisfies the topic description. For ease of comparison with (C7B), the first line in 
(C7A) again gives a Russell-style abbreviation while the next two lines spell it out. 
To qualify as the closest and greatest our top stack - here, the individual a 
- must meet two requirements. First, it must be in the set of individuals at issue. 
That is, a is part of the contextual base plurality b and is a dog that bites the 
addressee. And secondly, compared to any competing individual x that also meets 
the first requirement, a ranks as i-closer - i.e . ,  it contains only most i-prominent 
atoms - as well as i-greater - i.e., it contains all of them. 
Depending on the number - singular or plural - the competing individuals 
will be either all atoms, or else atoms as well as pluralities . Accordingly, topical 
maximization will select either the unique most prominent atomic individual of the 
lot, as in (7' A), or else the greatest most prominent plurality. So on the individual­
centered reading, topical maximization reconstructs the lattice-theoretic analysis of 
definite noun phrases developed by Sharvy ( 1980) and Link ( 1983) and integrates it 
with the insights of Groenendijk et a1 ( 1995) concerning contextual domain 
restrictions to currently prominent individuals. 
The final example ( 12), from Hindi, illustrates the need for maximizing 
stacks, not just dref objects, and for restricting this operation to the top stack only. 
( 1 2) jin do laRkoN-ne jis laRkii-ko ek phool diyaa 
which two bOYS-ERG which girl-ACC one flower gave 
T ( [XI I Xl C de, 2bsr(xl)] ; [x21 x2 C de, grr(x2)] ; 
[x3 I flr(X3)' givr(xl , x2, x3»)) ?;  
us laRkii-ne un laRkoN-ko pasand kiyaa. 
that girl-ERG these bOYS-ACC like did 
[ I grr(de), 2bsr(del)' liker(de, del )] 
(T 12) T ( [X I 1 2bsr(xl)] ; [x2 1 grr(X2)] ; [x3 I flr(x3), givr(xl , X2, X3)] )  
- (section 2, contextual domains b :=  1t1 , iT), b := 1t1, ll.j)) 
T Aij 3X3X2X I (x3 . X2 . X l . i = j /\ X l C b /\ X2 C b 
- (T4) 
/\ 2bs w. (Xl)  /\ gr w .  (x2)/\fl(x3) /\ giv w. (X l ' X2 , X3) )  J J J 
Aij (3X3X2X I (X3 . X2 . X l . i = j  /\ X l C b /\ X2 C b 
/\ 2bs w. (Xl) /\ gr w. (X2)/\ fl(x3) /\ giv w. (X l ' X2, X3) )  J J J 
/\ Vh(3x '3X'2X' I (X '3 . X'2 . X' l . i = h /\ X' l C b /\ X'2 C b 
/\ 2bs w. (X'l) /\ gr w .  (X' 2)/\ fl(X'3) /\ giv w. (X'l ' X' 2 ' x '3) )  J J J 
� T j Sj T h /\ T h Cj T j)) 
- (eliminate h, rearrange, T3) 
Aij 3X3X2X I (X3 . X2 . X l . i = j  /\ X l C b /\ x2 C b 
/\ 2bs w. (Xl) /\ gr w. (x2)/\fl(x3) /\ giv w. (X l ' X2 ' X3) J J J 
/\ VX'2X'I (X'1 C b /\ X'2 C b 
/\ 2bs w. (X' 1 ) /\ gr w .  (X' 2)/\ 3x3(fl(x'3) /\ giv w . (X' l ' X' 2' x '3) )  J J J 
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In the DRT style format, ( 12) gives rise to recentering by adding the dref s 
in (RI2), and also adds or tests factual information via the conditions listed in (CI2) .  
(Rl2) j = (Wi' Tj, .1) (after 
T [ . . .  ])  h = j (after comment) 
de b a" a" 
del a + a' a + a' 
de2 b b 
de b f f 
del b b 
(Cl2) Topic description atj 
• (a", a + a') = THEi A(X2, XI)[XI C b A X2 C b A 2bs w. (Xl)  A gr w. (x2) , , 
.- a + a' C b A a" c b A 2bs w. (a + a') A gr w (a") , , 
A 3x3(fl w. (X3) A giv w. (a + a', a", x3)) , , 
A 'l;fx2 XI [XI C b A X2 C b A 2bs w. (Xl)  A gr w (x2) , , 
• fl w if) A giv w . (a + a', a", j) , , 
Comment at h 
• like w. (a", a + a') , 
A 3x3(fl w. (X3) A giv w. (X I ' X2 , X3) ]  , , 
A rough translation of ( 1 2) is 'As for the two boys and the girl they gave a 
flower, that girl liked those boys ' .  That is, ( 12) is about the pair ofj-marked dref s .  
Accordingly, the matrix comment can satisfy the aboutness presupposition without 
addressing the backgrounded (ek-marked) flower, and topical maximization -
targeting the closest and greatest top stack - in effect selects the closest and 
greatest pair, (a", a + a'), of two boys, a + a', and a girl, a", they gave a flower. 
That is - revealing the true generalization behind the pattern of topical 
maximization we have seen so far - our topical pair (a", a + a') will qualify as the 
closest and greatest just in case it meets two requirements. First, it must be in the 
set of pairs at issue. That is, a + a' is a plurality of two boys contained in a 
contextual base plurality b ,  a" is a girl contained in a (possibly different) base 
plurality b, and a + a' gave a" a flower. And secondly, compared to any competing 
pair (X2 ' X l )  which also meets the fIrst requirement, pointwise comparison ranks (a", a + a') as i-closer - i.e. , a" and a + a' contain only most i-prominent atoms 
- as well as i-greater - i.e. , they contain all of them. 
6. Conclusion 
Crosslinguistic evidence shows that the semantic parallels between individuals and 
possibilities are even more pervasive and more detailed than has so far been 
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recognized. In addition to the well-known referential and anaphoric parallels, there 
are centering parallels - revealed by correlative topic-comment structures -
concerning domain-neutral topical maximization and aboutness presuppositions. 
These point-for-point parallels across domains can be explicated in all their 
exquisite detail in a semantic representation language - Logic of Change with 
Centered Worlds - which integrates theoretical insights drawn from three sources :  
The Logic of Change of Muskens ( 1995), the extension to modal anaphora due to 
Stone ( 1997), and the related Logic of Change with Centering of Bittner (2001) .  
This study also illustrates a more general point. When it comes to universal 
semantics, we can trust every natural language to tell nothing but truth, but we 
cannot trust any one language to tell the whole truth. There is simply too much to 
tell. All too often, English-based theories of semantic phenomena are viewed not as 
just that - stories about English - but as stories about universal semantics. This 
paper illustrates how dramatically the English-based picture may still be 
transformed by evidence from typologically distant languages. For this evidence 
may reveal that the familiar facts of English are just a few pieces of a far bigger 
pattern - for example, a centering pattern big enough to subsume both definite 
noun phrases and conditional clauses as manifestations, in different semantic 
domains, of the same domain-neutral principles of topic-comment articulation. 
Endnotes 
* 
I have benefited from conversations with Matthew Stone, Hans Kamp, Kit Fine 
and other participants in SALT XI, Semantics Group at IMS Stuttgart (May 2000) , 
Tel Aviv workshop on Syntax and Semantics of Relative Clause Constructions and 
my colloquia at the Center for General Linguistics, Typology and Universals (ZAS) 
in Berlin and Department of Linguistics at UCSC. I also thank my native speaker 
consultants on West Greenlandic Eskimo (inhabitants of Illorsuit in 1978-9 and 
Ukkusissat in 1982-4) and Hindi (Rajesh Bhatt, Utpal Lahiri, Anoop Mahajan, 
Tara Mohanan) . This research was supported by the NSF grant BCS-9905600. 
1 Abbreviations in the glosses. Agreement: 1 = 1 st person, 2 = 2nd person, 3 = 
3rd person, F = feminine, M = masculine, PL = plural, SG = singular. Case: ACC = 
accusative ERG = ergative, GEN = genitive, INS = instrumental, MOD = modalis, NOM = 
nominative. Tense / Aspect: FUT = future, NPST = non-past, PRG = progressive, PRS = 
present, PST = past. Mood / Mode: EXP = expected, IND
l 
= intransitive indicative, 
IND
2 
= transitive indicative, INF = infinitive. Centering: ST = same topic, TOP = topic. 2 
In Polish but not Eskimo, this use of bare obliques is limited to mass nouns. 
3 In both languages, a bare infinitive command is curt (e.g. ,  a master to a slave). 
4 Dayal ( 1996), who focuses on individual-centered correlatives, even goes so far 
as to deny the kinship with conditional correlatives . But her radical claim, that 
'correlatives and conditionals encode fundamentally different dependencies' (p.  
198), is based on a grammaticality contrast which only shows an orthogonal point 
- to wit, the contrast between topical vs. non-topical NP' s  (see ( 1 1 )-( 12) below). 
5 Further conditions and boxes will be added as they become relevant. 
6 The plain part-whole relation, denoted by 'k:' , is interpreted in the usual way: 
(tl k: t2) := Ai (tloiwj k: t2°iw) 
:= Ai Va(a E tl Oiwj � a  E t2°iw) (a ranges over atoms or worlds) 
7 As it stands, my theory does not cover multi-case readings, which involve 
additional universal quantification over 'cases' (see Kadmon 1990, Dayal 1996). In 
future work I hope to extend the story to these readings, by positing more abstract 
types of drefs - perhaps dynamic sa-drefs (a la Stone & Hardt 1997). 
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